Recurrent Zoonotic Transmission of Nipah Virus into Humans, Bangladesh, 2001–2007 by Luby, Stephen P. et al.
Human	Nipah	outbreaks	recur	in	a	specific	region	and	
time of year in Bangladesh. Fruit bats are the reservoir host 
for	 Nipah	 virus.	 We	 identified	 23	 introductions	 of	 Nipah	
virus into human populations in central and northwestern 
Bangladesh from 2001 through 2007. Ten introductions af-
fected multiple persons (median 10). Illness onset occurred 
from December through May but not every year. We identi-
fied	122	cases	of	human	Nipah	infection.	The	mean	age	
of	case-patients	was	27	years;	87	(71%)	died.	In	62	(51%)	
Nipah	virus–infected	patients,	illness	developed	5–15	days	
after	close	contact	with	another	Nipah	case-patient.	Nine	
(7%)	Nipah	case-patients	transmitted	virus	to	others.	Nipah	
case-patients	who	had	difficulty	breathing	were	more	likely	
than	those	without	respiratory	difficulty	to	transmit	Nipah	
(12%	vs.	0%,	p	=	0.03).	Although	a	small	minority	of	infected	
patients	transmit	Nipah	virus,	more	than	half	of	identified	
cases result from person-to-person transmission. Interven-
tions to prevent virus transmission from bats to humans and 
from person to person are needed.  
H
uman Nipah virus infection, characterized primarily 
by fever and encephalitis, was first recognized in a 
large outbreak of 276 reported cases in peninsular Malaysia 
and Singapore that occurred from September 1998 through 
June 1999 (1,2). Contact with sick pigs was the primary 
risk  factor  for  infection  (3).  A  newly  identified  porcine   
respiratory and neurologic syndrome developed in some 
pigs  infected  with  the  Nipah  virus;  this  syndrome  was 
characterized by fever, barking cough, behavioral changes, 
uncoordinated gait, spasms, and myoclonus (4). The out-
break of Nipah virus infection in humans ceased when the 
infected herds of pigs in the region were culled (5).
Substantial data implicate fruit bats (Pteropus spp.) 
as the natural reservoir host of Nipah virus. In initial stud-
ies after the Malaysia outbreak, 16/64 (25%) P. vampyrus 
and P. hypomelanus fruit bats had neutralizing antibodies 
to Nipah virus (6). Nipah virus was subsequently isolated 
from urine specimens collected under a P. hypomelanus 
roost from partially eaten fruit dropped during feeding ac-
tivity in Malaysia (7) and from urine collected under a P. 
lylei roost in Cambodia (8). Nipah virus–specific RNA was 
identified in saliva and urine samples from P. lylei fruit bats 
in Thailand (9).
The nucleotide sequences of Nipah virus strains iso-
lated from pigs and persons in Malaysia were remarkably 
similar (5,10,11) and suggest that the entire outbreak was 
caused by 1 or 2 closely related strains. Indeed, all human 
cases of Nipah infection in Malaysia and Singapore could 
have originated from a single or perhaps 2 introductions of 
Nipah virus from its bat reservoir into pigs (10,12). 
In Bangladesh, by contrast, recurrent Nipah outbreaks 
have been recognized since 2001 (13–17), and the strains 
of Nipah isolates show substantial heterogeneity in their 
nucleotide sequences (11). This heterogeneity suggests re-
peated introductions of Nipah virus from its host reservoir 
into the human population in Bangladesh.
A single species of fruit bats of the genus Pteropus, 
P. giganteus, lives in Bangladesh and is widely distributed 
throughout the country (18). Blood samples from P. gigan-
teus bats in Bangladesh and neighboring India commonly 
have antibodies to Nipah virus (13,19). The conditions that 
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permit recurrent introduction of Nipah virus from fruit bats 
to persons in Bangladesh are unknown. Besides the ten-
dency for Nipah virus outbreaks to reoccur in Bangladesh, 
a second notable difference in Nipah virus epidemiology in 
Bangladesh is that, in contrast to Malaysia, where person-
to-person transmission of Nipah virus was not confirmed 
(20),  person-to-person  transmission  has  been  repeatedly 
observed in Bangladesh (15,16).
The  high  prevalence  of  antibodies  to  Nipah  virus 
among Pteropus spp. bats suggests that Nipah virus is well 
adapted  to  transmission  between  individual  bats  of  this   
genus. We hypothesize that when a Pteropus spp. bat sheds 
Nipah virus in Bangladesh, this virus occasionally infects 
1 or more persons. Once people are infected, the epidemic 
chain of transmission can be perpetuated by person-to-per-
son transmission (16). 
A more complete understanding of the character of 
Nipah virus infection in Bangladesh has been limited by 
the analysis of relatively small individual outbreaks. We 
combined data from the 7 recognized human outbreaks and 
the identified sporadic cases of Nipah virus in Bangladesh 
from 2001 through 2007. The objective was to describe the 
introduction of Nipah virus into the human population and 
the epidemiology of person-to-person transmission.
Methods
We reviewed available data from investigations of all of 
the human Nipah infections recognized in Bangladesh from 
2001 through 2007. Information from the separate investiga-
tions was combined into a single database. Not all variables 
of interest were collected from the earliest outbreaks, but be-
cause many of the same investigators were involved across 
the outbreaks, data were collected in similar formats. 
Persons were classified as being infected with Nipah 
virus if they had fever with new onset of altered mental 
status, seizures, or severe shortness of breath and either had 
specific antibodies against Nipah virus or were part of a 
cluster of similar case-patients in the same region, with at 
least 1 of the case-patients being Nipah-antibody positive. 
In addition, if a person had fever and immunoglobulin (Ig) 
M antibody to Nipah, that person was classified as being 
infected with Nipah virus. 
We classified Nipah cases as part of a cluster if at least 
1 other Nipah case was identified in the same community 
within 3 weeks of onset of illness. If no other cases ap-
peared in the same community within 3 weeks, the Nipah 
case was classified as an isolated case.
We counted distinct introductions of Nipah virus into 
the human population. Each cluster of Nipah case-patients 
and each sporadic case was counted as a separate Nipah 
introduction.
We classified persons as primary case-patients if ill-
ness  developed  without  known  contact  with  any  other 
Nipah case-patients, as secondary case-patients if Nipah 
disease developed 5–15 days after close contact with other 
Nipah case-patients, and as Nipah spreaders if at least 1 
person with whom that person had close contact had Nipah 
illness develop 5–15 days after that contact. We collected 
geographic coordinates by using global positioning sys-
tems from the home of each case-patient.
Laboratory Methods
The field team, which involved a large number of dif-
ferent people over the course of the many outbreak investi-
gations, centrifuged whole blood specimens and brought the 
separated serum on wet ice to the laboratory at the Interna-
tional Center for Diarrheal Diseases Research, Bangladesh 
(ICDDR,B), where it was stored at –70°C. Before 2007, 
serum samples were shipped on dry ice to the US Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and tested with 
an IgM capture enzyme immunoassay (EIA), which detects 
Nipah IgM, and with an indirect EIA for Nipah IgG (21). 
Nipah (Malaysia prototype) virus antigen was used in both 
assays. In 2007, the Nipah antibody testing was conducted 
at the government of Bangladesh’s Institute of Epidemiol-
ogy Disease Control and Research using reagents provided 
by the Special Pathogens Branch of CDC in Atlanta. All 
positive samples were confirmed at CDC.
Statistics
We assessed whether differences in proportions were 
more extreme than would be expected by chance by us-
ing the χ2 test or the Fisher exact test when the expected 
cell size was <5. The basic reproductive number (R0) is the 
average number of persons infected by an infectious per-
son during his or her entire infectious period when he/she 
enters a totally susceptible population (22). We estimated 
R0 by dividing the number of persons infected by a primary 
case-patient by the total number of primary case-patients. 
Ethics
Many of these data were collected as part of routine 
surveillance  or  emergency  outbreak  investigations,  so 
study protocols did not undergo human subjects review. In 
2005, a protocol for establishing a formal Nipah surveil-
lance system and the strategy for outbreak investigations 
were reviewed and approved by the Ethical Review Com-
mittee of the ICDDR,B.
Results
A total of 122 Nipah case-patients were identified; 74 
(61%) were male, and the mean of all case-patients age was 
27 years (range 2–75). Eighty-seven (71%) of 122 died. 
Fifty-nine (48%) infections were serologically confirmed. 
Of the 63 case-patients that were not laboratory confirmed, 
59 (94%) died before any blood was collected; 4 (6%) had 
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an initial serum specimen without detectable antibodies but 
died before a follow-up specimen could be collected. 
We identified 23 introductions of Nipah virus into hu-
man populations in central and northwestern Bangladesh 
from 2001 through 2007 (Figure 1). Ten introductions in-
volved clusters with a median of 10 affected persons (range 
2–35). Thirteen Nipah introductions resulted in isolated hu-
man infections.
The onset of illness for the index cases for the 23 human 
Nipah introductions occurred from December 31 through 
April 20 (Figure 2). The probability that all 23 index cases 
would randomly occur in 5 contiguous months is (5 / 12)23 × 
12 = 0.00000002. The number of Nipah case-patients varied 
by year; most cases were recognized in 2004, and no cases 
were recognized in 2002 and 2006 (Figure 3).
In  62  (51%)  Nipah  case-patients,  illness  developed 
from  apparent  person-to-person  transmission.  None  of 
these cases were professional healthcare workers exposed 
to Nipah case-patients on the job. The case-fatality ratio 
was similar for primary and secondary cases (75% vs. 66%, 
respectively; p = 0.28). 
Nine  case-patients  (7%)  were  Nipah  spreaders  who 
transmitted  Nipah  infection  to  other  persons.  All  Nipah 
spreaders died; 4 of these were classified as secondary cas-
es. Nipah case-patients who had difficulty breathing during 
their illness were more likely to be Nipah spreaders (12% 
vs. 0%, p = 0.03). Similarly, Nipah case-patients who had 
cough were more likely to be Nipah spreaders (12% vs. 
2%, p = 0.080). Patients classified as secondary cases were 
just as likely to have difficulty breathing as those classified 
as primary cases (65% vs. 66%, p = 0.94).
Nipah case-patients who died were more likely to be 
Nipah spreaders than were Nipah case-patients who sur-
vived (10% vs. 0%; Fisher exact test, p = 0.057). Persons 
who spread Nipah were no more likely to be primary Nipah 
case-patients than were Nipah patients who did not spread 
Nipah (56% vs. 49%, odds ratio 1.3, 95% confidence inter-
val 0.34–5.1, p = 0.74). Nipah spreaders transmitted Nipah 
to a mean of 7 persons (range 1–22). 
Among the 10 clusters, 5 involved person-to-person 
transmission ranging from 2 to 5 generations of transmis-
sion. The 60 primary Nipah case-patients infected 29 sub-
sequent persons. The estimated basic reproductive number 
was 0.48. 
Fourteen secondary Nipah case-patients had contact 
with a primary Nipah case-patient for <2 days. The me-
dian incubation period of these secondary cases was 9 days 
(range 6–11 days).
Discussion
These introductions of Nipah virus from its presumed 
reservoir in Pteropus bats to humans in Bangladesh were 
clustered, both in time of year as well as in specific years. 
Occurring during winter and spring in certain years, this 
clustering  in  Bangladesh  suggests  that  the  specific  con-
ditions necessary for Nipah virus transmission from bats 
to humans occurs only periodically. Perhaps shedding of 
Nipah virus by Pteropus bats is seasonal, and because of 
population dynamics and the accumulation of susceptible 
juvenile bats over time, transmission is quite low in some 
years compared with other years when widespread shed-
ding and transmission occur. 
The presumed wildlife reservoir of Nipah virus, bats 
of the genus Pteropus, is widely distributed across Ban-
gladesh, the rest of the Indian subcontinent, and Southeast 
Asia  (18).  Wherever  Pteropus  bats  have  been  collected 
and  tested,  they  commonly  have  had  antibodies  against 
Nipah or a related virus (8,9,13,23,24). Human Nipah in-
fections in Bangladesh, however, have been recognized in 
a confined geographic area. The Institute of Epidemiology 
Disease Control and Research in Bangladesh has national 
surveillance for disease outbreaks. Outbreaks involving the 
deaths of several previously healthy persons, which is char-
acteristic of Nipah outbreaks, typically generate substantial 
local concern, media attention, and notification of local and 
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Figure	1.	Locations	of	human	Nipah	virus	introductions	(red	dots),	
Bangladesh, 2001–2007.RESEARCH
central  health  authorities.  Despite  investigations  of  out-
breaks in all regions of the country, all confirmed Nipah 
outbreaks have occurred in the same central and northwest-
ern regions (Figure 1). Notably, the only 2 outbreaks that 
have been reported from India have been in regions within 
50 kilometers of the border with Bangladesh and imme-
diately contiguous with the affected areas in Bangladesh 
(25,26). One hypothesis that would explain this geographic 
concentration of human cases is that the bats are attracted 
to specific foods available in these areas during the winter 
and spring; people living in these communities are occa-
sionally exposed to foods contaminated with bat urine or 
saliva that contains Nipah virus. One outbreak of Nipah vi-
rus was associated with consumption of raw date palm sap, 
which is harvested from December through March in this 
region (14). In 21 of the 23 recognized index case-patients, 
Nipah virus illness developed during this harvest season.
Person-to-person transmission is a major pathway for 
human  Nipah  virus  infection  in  Bangladesh,  accounting 
for 51% of recognized cases in this review. By contrast, 
in Malaysia and Singapore, person-to-person transmission 
was not confirmed, although 1 nurse who cared for Nipah 
patients in an intensive care unit in Malaysia and reported 
no clinical illness had serologic evidence of Nipah virus 
infection and brain magnetic resonance imaging consis-
tent with Nipah virus infection (27). Even if occasional 
unrecognized person-to-person transmission of Nipah vi-
rus occurred in the outbreak in Malaysia, person-to-person 
transmission is much more apparent and common in Ban-
gladesh. Moreover, the outbreak in Siliguri, India, in 2001 
was  also  characterized  by  widespread  person-to-person 
transmission (25). 
Three factors likely contributed to the higher frequen-
cy of person-to-person transmission of Nipah virus in Ban-
gladesh than was observed in Malaysia. First, respiratory 
disease associated with Nipah infection was more common 
and more severe in Bangladesh compared with that in Ma-
laysia and Singapore (28–30). Earlier studies demonstrated 
that Nipah virus was present in respiratory secretions of 
some  Nipah  virus–infected  patients  (11,31).  We  found 
that Nipah case-patients who had difficulty breathing were 
much more likely to be Nipah spreaders. Together, these 
findings suggest that when a Nipah virus–infected patient 
has  a  symptomatic  respiratory  tract  infection  associated 
with Nipah virus, the patient can shed an infectious inocu-
lum of Nipah virus in his respiratory secretions. In the larg-
est recognized Nipah outbreak in Bangladesh, touching a 
patient who had respiratory difficulties was a risk factor for 
developing Nipah infection (16). The personal care typi-
cally provided to ill and dying relatives in Bangladesh is 
likely a second important contributor to person-to-person 
transmission. This care is characterized by close physical 
interaction, frequent contact with a patient’s saliva, and a 
lack of basic infection control practices because the para-
digm  of  communicable  disease  is  inconsistent  with  the 
prevailing cultural interpretation of illness (32). Third, all 
Nipah virus strains from human cases in Malaysia were 
genetically similar, in contrast to the marked diversity of 
the strains in Bangladesh (11). Some strains possibly pos-
sess genetic characteristics that facilitate person-to-person 
transmission. 
Our 0.48 estimate of the basic reproductive number 
of Nipah virus in rural Bangladesh, a resource-poor set-
ting with extremely limited infection control practices, 
suggests that Nipah virus is unlikely to cause a sustained 
human  pandemic  from  person-to-person  transmission. 
This conclusion is further supported by our observation 
of 23 separate introductions of the virus into the human 
population; none of these introductions resulted in sus-
tained person-to-person transmission. Indeed, only 1 of 
the introductions exceeded 2 generations of transmission 
(16). However, we could study only 9 patients who trans-
mitted the Nipah virus. Thus, our understanding of the 
variability in transmission of different strains of the virus 
in different contexts is limited.
This analysis has limitations. First, we almost certainly 
did not identify all human Nipah virus infections that oc-
curred in Bangladesh from 2001 through 2007. Many per-
sons in Bangladesh, especially the impoverished, do not 
access the formal healthcare system, even when seriously 
ill (33,34). The available data on human Nipah virus infec-
tion in Bangladesh are biased toward infections acquired in 
outbreaks recognized by public health authorities. Because 
meningoencephalitis is a common cause of hospitalization 
in  Bangladesh,  sporadic  cases  that  are  unrecognized  as 
Nipah virus infection may be the more common presenta-
tion of Nipah virus infection in the country. Indeed, during 
2004 and 2007, years when multiple outbreaks were iden-
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Figure	2.	Human	Nipah	virus	infections	in	Bangladesh,	by	month	of	
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tified, many patients who sought treatment for symptoms 
of encephalitis in hospitals located near identified outbreak 
areas were tested for Nipah virus. This testing identified 
several additional patients infected with the virus who lived 
quite a distance from the outbreak villages and who had 
no apparent connection to other cases. Thus, surveillance 
almost certainly underestimates the public health impact 
of Nipah virus infection in Bangladesh and may underesti-
mate its geographic and seasonal range. Because outbreaks 
are more likely to lead to recognition of Nipah virus infec-
tion than sporadic cases and person-to-person transmission 
can occur only in clusters, the overall proportion of Nipah 
virus infections in Bangledesh that are transmitted person 
to person is probably <50%. 
A second limitation is that the calculation of the ba-
sic reproductive rate assumed that all persons infected by 
a primary case-patient were identified. The investigation 
team could have failed to recognize all cases, especially 
in persons with milder or asymptomatic infection. In Ma-
laysia, among 178 persons without symptoms who lived 
on farms where at least 1 person with confirmed Nipah en-
cephalitis was identified, 20 (11%) had antibodies against 
Nipah virus (3). This possibility of asymptomatic infection 
suggests that our estimate of the basic reproductive rate is 
a minimal estimate. However, in outbreaks, when mild or 
asymptomatic persons were screened in Bangladesh, few 
additional Nipah cases were identified (J. Hossain, pers. 
comm.).  Moreover,  only  patients  who  died  transmitted 
the infection, so the possible infection of persons in whom 
mild illness developed is unlikely to contribute to the risk 
for pandemic transmission.
A third limitation is that we identified only 9 persons 
who transmitted Nipah virus and so have limited statisti-
cal power to assess their characteristics. Indeed, the asso-
ciation of cough with Nipah virus transmission and death 
with Nipah transmission are above the traditional guideline 
for statistical significance. However, the weight of the evi-
dence, including an association with respiratory illness that 
meets  the  traditional  criterion  for  statistical  significance 
and the isolation of Nipah virus in respiratory secretions, 
suggests that person-to-person transmission occurs occa-
sionally from virus-infected patients who are efficient re-
spiratory transmitters of the virus.
A fourth limitation is that this analysis assumes that 
persons in whom Nipah illness developed 5–15 days af-
ter contact with a Nipah patient were considered infected 
by the contact. If the subsequent case-patient had a similar 
environmental exposure to Nipah virus as the initial case-
patient, this approach may overestimate the proportion of 
cases that result from person-to-person transmission. How-
ever, Nipah virus is readily recovered from the saliva of 
infected persons (11,31), and epidemiologic studies of in-
dividual outbreaks implicate contact with Nipah-infected   
patients as a risk factor for transmission (16). Moreover, 
the observed 6–11-day window between exposure and dis-
ease is consistent with incubation periods for other human 
viral infections. Thus, person-to-person transmission is the 
most likely route of transmission in these scenarios.
The recurrent introduction of Nipah virus from its fruit 
bat reservoir to humans in Bangladesh causes outbreaks 
with high fatality rates and substantial neurologic sequelae 
among survivors (35). Fruit bats have a critical niche in the 
ecosystem, contributing to both plant pollination and distri-
bution of seeds (36,37). Preventing human Nipah virus in-
fections in Bangladesh is difficult because these infections 
are relatively rare compared with many other serious and 
more common health threats faced by the large population 
of this low-income country. Improved understanding of the 
mechanism of zoonotic transmission from bats to humans 
may help identify feasible approaches to prevent future in-
troductions of the virus into the human population. Inter-
ventions to reduce the risk for pathogen exposure by mini-
mizing saliva contact or improving hand hygiene among 
persons who care for seriously ill patients in severely re-
source-constrained settings could reduce person-to-person 
transmission of Nipah as well as transmission of other dan-
gerous pathogens. In confirmed or highly suspected cases 
of Nipah virus infection, respiratory droplet precautions 
may also be warranted.
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